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Preface: 
 
This paper presents for the most part the penultimate version of a working paper that has 
since been published (end of February) as an occasional paper in the series Politische 
Italien-Forschung, edited by Alexander Grasse at the University of Giessen, Germany:   
http://www.uni-giessen.de/cms/fbz/fb03/institute/institut-fur-
politikwissenschaft/pifo/occasional 
 
The presentation will focus more on the issue of state/citizenship itself. In particular, I 
intend to make the distinction between a political citizenship and the capitalist market 
defined EU citizenship rights more explicit. This also in an effort to distinguish my 
interpretation of the situation of citizenship in the EU – namely as norms, rules and 
practices that are expressions of three not easily reconciled if indeed overlapping 
dimensions: cosmopolitanism, national state-defined sovereignty, and the common 
market – from Jenson’s interpretation of a “citizenship regime” (Jenson 2007).  
 
                                                 
* The paper presents a first result of a four weeks research stay in Romania in July 2008 – exactly when the 
story broke. A GEAR UP grant from the University of Wisconsin, Whitewater, provided the necessary 
financial  support.  I  would  like  to  thank  (albeit  in  summary  fashion;  and  some  explicitly  requested 
anonymity) my interview and discussion partners and the Institute for Political Research at the University 
of Bucharest for providing a helpful academic environment.  F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On July 17, 2008, the Romanian newspaper Cotidianul carried on its front-page under the 
headline “Fingerprinting of Roma: A finger for Berlusconi” a picture of a little Roma girl 
displaying an internationally well-known hand gesture : a downside up closed hand with 
an outstretched middle finger.
1 
At  the  time,  tensions  between  Italy  and  Romania  had  reached  a  new  high  as 
Italy’s new right-wing government began to step up its anti-immigration and anti-crime 
policies in an effort to assuage the Italian public’s increasing concerns over immigrants 
and crime. One of the final measures in that effort, introduced in late spring, a registration 
of Italy’s Roma population (dubbed a census), a population including many Romanian 
citizens, was to be implemented via fingerprinting, which explicitly was also to include 
minors.
2 
With  the  European  Commission  giving  its  assent  to  the  Italian  fingerprinting 
scheme in early fall 2008, the issue may appear somewhat moot. The Commission, it has 
been reported, declared itself satisfied that the fingerprinting scheme would only serve in 
instances where no other means of establishing a person’s identity is available.
3 And, 
indeed, since those heady days of summer, even Romanian media and public attention to 
the policy measure have dwindled again as well. 
Yet  it  bears  to  re-examine  this  intra-EU-European  summer  clash  in  a  larger 
context. At issue in this intra-EU-European summer clash was, and indeed continues to 
be,  the  very  meaning  –  and  therefore  the  (potential)  make-up  –  of  a  EU-European 
citizenship. As I will argue in the following, the central problem behind a EU-European 
citizenship, as evidenced in the summer clash between Italy and Romania, lies in the 
                                                 
1 The line “offri un dito a Maroni” (the reference is to Roberto Maroni, Northern League, interior minister 
in  the  new  Berlusconi  government)  is  below  the  picture.  The  title  page  is  available  at 
http://www.cotidianul.ro/img/editions/pdf/editia_2008-07-17.pdf. 
2  “Berlusconi  unveils  anti-crime  measures  for  Italy”,  International  Herald  Tribune,  May  21,  2008; 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/21/europe/italy.php; last accessed: September 13, 2008. 
3  “EU  gives  blessing  for  Italy’s  Roma  fingerprinting  scheme”,  EUobserver,  September  5,  2008; 
http://euobserver.com/22/26691; last accessed: September 13, 2008. “L’UE: ‘Le misure italiane sui rom 
non  sono  discriminatorie’”,  Corriere  della  Sera,  September  4,  2008; 
http://www.corriere.it/politica/08_settembre_04/nomadi_ue_misure_c277b0f0-7a70-11dd-a3dd-
00144f02aabc.shtml. F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  3 
fissures  between  the  construction  of  citizenship  as  a  political  identity  defined  by  a 
nationally-framed “state” and “Europe” as topos of a historical-cultural and normative 
identity claim. To the extent that the EU continues to be associated not with protective 
functions and its enabling functions (which grant positive, as opposed to negative rights) 
have  become  associated  with  “externalized”  threats,  a  EU-European  citizenship  will 
continue to remain a mere formal sum of its substantive, namely member-state based, 
parts.  That  the  normative  invocation  of  a  common  European  identity  at  the  moment 
appears less and less able to muster the force necessary to check the political allure of a 
return to the strong nationally-framed protective state is therefore part and parcel of the 
larger crisis of institutional reform that presently defines the EU-European project of 
regional integration. 
The  following  critical  analysis  of  the  present  state  (pun  intended)  of  a  EU-
European citizenship in the light of the noted summer clash is divided into two parts (2. 
and 3.). After providing an explication of the problematic of citizenship and situating this 
problematic within its European context (2.), I address Berlusconi’s role in Italian politics 
today and analyze the vision behind the security measures (2.1); this is followed by a 
discussion  of  the  Roma  as  a  paradigmatically  European,  namely,  non-national  group 
(2.2); then I turn to the (ethnic) Romanian (political) insecurities about both a national 
and a European identity (2.3). The third part discusses the project of a EU-European 
citizenship in the light of the fissures between the construction of citizenship as a political 
identity defined by a nationally-framed “state” and “Europe” as topos of a historical-
cultural and normative identity claim (3.). Again, the very elements of the summer clash 
between Italy and Romania are indicative of a EU-European citizenship: its problems, 
prospects, and promise. 
 
 
2. European Citizenship as Contested Terrain 
 
Citizenship arguably has become the central watchword of European integration in recent 
years. The well-known diagnosis of a democratic “deficit” ailing the European Union 
could not live without it in both its analysis and prescription. At issue in that diagnosis is F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  4 
the  lack  of  institutional  representation  offered  to  a  European  public,  as  European 
integration has remained an elite-level project both in design and execution. It is the 
absence of such institutional representation that (in this view) accounts for the (increasing 
and/or sustained) Euroscepticism among member states’ publics. To put it sharply, while 
an emerging European public can be seen in the abstract via a common political space, 
this public unfortunately has institutionally nowhere to go but (ironically) to blame an 
abstract “Brussels” for its predicament (Gabel and Anderson 2004). 
At the same time, the meaning of “citizenship” itself has become an item of much 
debate  in  the  political  and  social  sciences.  It  has  become  quite  commonplace  in  the 
literature  to  distinguish  two  dimensions/meanings  of  citizenship.  On  the  one  hand, 
citizenship  is  a  legal-administrative  construct  of  “belonging”.  While  granting  certain 
rights or privileges and affixing certain responsibilities, it is tied to a specific – legitimate 
and sovereign – state entity. Citizenship here always has its own place – a territorially 
defined  political  community  –  and  as  such  cannot  be  seen  as  devoid  of  a  concrete 
political space (hence: debates about migration and citizenship in terms of how open a 
polity is to migration and how it defines the rights of non-members or not-yet members). 
On the other hand, and setting itself against the former view, citizenship has also become 
emphasized as a normative claim towards both emancipation and participation in any 
community or societal context; a claim that in the final instance recognizes all humans as 
global  citizens.  In  this  cosmopolitan  conception,  the  values  (rights  and  –  to  a  lesser 
degree – responsibilities) that underlie and animate citizenship are neither defined nor 
contained by any territorial political entity, let alone by the concept of a nation-state 
(Nash 2007; Wagner 2007). 
The  European  Union  and  by  implication  the  entire  process  of  European 
integration in this sense can be seen as articulating those dual meanings of citizenship. 
Indeed, depending on which side of the fence, so to speak, one might wish to champion, 
the Union and European integration either fall short of realizing (hence: a democratic 
deficit) or actually come to embody “citizenship” (Delanty 2007). It is therefore not far 
fetched to define EU-European citizenship as contested terrain: contested between two 
modes of belonging, the communitarian-national and the cosmopolitan-global, thereby 
expressing a struggle over the very meaning of European integration itself. F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  5 
For the present purpose of explicating a European citizenship as contested terrain 
in this sense, it suffices to take a look at the European Union’s formulation of citizenship 
in the Treaties (the foundational law and legal framework of the Union). Here is the 
relevant formulation from the so-called Treaty of Nice, which at the time of this writing 
continues to be the Union framework in operation today: 
“Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship” 
[Article 17 TEC] (European Union 2006). 
 
If and when the revision signed in Lisbon in 2007 (the Lisbon or Reform Treaty), the 
revision made in response to the failed Constitutional effort, comes into effect (2009), the 
relevant passage will be the following: 
“Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship” 
[Article 20 FEU] (Council of the European Union 2008).
4 
 
In  the  first  place  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  “complement”  has  been  replaced  by 
“additional” in the Reform Treaty. Complement suggests completion: that something is 
missing from the latter (national citizenship) that the former (citizenship of the Union) 
remedies. Exactly this suggestion of national incompleteness has been taken away by the 
formulation in the Reform Treaty: as additional, EU citizenship serves the function of the 
cherry on top of a cake.
5 What might appear as splitting hairs needs to be seen in the 
context of what were tough negotiations in the wake of a failed “Constitutional” attempt. 
One of the central issues in those negotiations (and one of the reasons why the Reform 
Treaty  was  rejected  in  the  Irish  referendum)  was  the  concern  over  the  creation  of  a 
European  (EU)  “super-state”.  Key  in  the  negotiations  was  to  rescue  what  could  be 
rescued from the failed Constitutional Treaty while assuaging national concerns. Thus, 
the Reform Treaty does pay tribute to subsidiarity, to an increasing role of the European 
and the national Parliaments – and, one can surmise, toned down the language of a EU-
                                                 
4 TEU and FEU are used to specify the two parts of the consolidated version (TEU: Treaty on European 
Union; FEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). Note that because the Reform Treaty was 
rejected by the Irish referendum on June 12, 2008, its present status remains unclear since all member states 
have to ratify the Treaty in order for it to take effect. 
5 The point remains even when looking into different language versions. 1) TEC in German: “ergänzt …, 
ersetzt sie aber nicht”; in Italian: “un complemento … e non sostituisce quest’ultima”; in French: “complete 
… et ne la remplace pas”; [no official text in Romanian]. 2) FEU in German: “tritt … hinzu, ersetzt sie aber 
nicht”; in Italian: “si aggiunge … e non sostituisce quest’ultima”; in French: “s’ajoute … et ne la remplace 
pas”; in Romanian: “nu inlocueste …, ci se adauga”. F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  6 
European  citizenship  in  favor  of  firmly  signaling  that  citizenship  was  to  remain  the 
prerogative of each national member state.
6 
This reformulation of the citizenship clause – again: at the time of this writing the 
fate of the Reform Treaty remains unclear – here only serves to emphasize the larger 
point: from a formal-legal standpoint, a EU-European citizenship does not exist. One is a 
citizen of a member state and only by virtue of the respective state being a member state 
of the European Union can a citizen consider him or herself a citizen of the EU (any EU 
passport will tell that story: the issuing authority is no EU bureaucracy…). 
However, it would be wrong simply to conclude that absent such formal-legal 
claim and recognition, no EU-European dimension to citizenship exists. Much like the 
rest of European integration, namely, the creation of what some scholars have dubbed 
“multi-level  governance”,  a  considerable  EU-European  dimension  to  citizenship  has 
come  about  by  “stealth”:  through  the  fact  that  fundamental  normative  commitments 
(including the four freedoms and the common market) were transformed into concrete 
policies and the spill-over effect of such policies into other policy-areas; backed initially 
and subsequently by the accepted and legally-enforceable doctrine of “direct effect” of 
EU regulations (Kohler-Koch, Conzelmann, Knodt 2004; Majone 2005). 
The dimension of EU citizenship that has thusly emerged “has grown out of the 
rights of Community nationals to free movement as economic actors” (Guild 2004, p. 
82). As workers within a unified market area (the EU’s common market), citizens of EU 
member states enjoy the right to free movement and residency within the entire EU area. 
Like goods, people have become freed in this sense. Yet exactly this process – another 
part of what has come to be viewed as “integration through law” – has also come to 
confine the notion of EU citizenship in two important ways. In the first place, member 
states have retained the right to define that freedom and confine residency, including in 
fact the use of deportation, by virtue of an acknowledged public policy prerogative based, 
in the last instance, on notions of public safety and security. Non-national residents, in 
short, can be treated differently than nationals by a member state. This difference (for 
example restricting the freedom of movement of a non-national within the territory of a 
member state) also accounts for the fact that administrative law is allowed to apply to 
                                                 
6 The latter is of course an empirical question, and I hope to have an answer to it relatively soon. F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  7 
non-nationals  in  instances  where  criminal  law  (and  its  procedural  protections)  would 
have to apply to nationals (Guild 2004, pp. 89-91). One should also note that in the cases 
of  the  late  Eastern  enlargement  entrants,  Romania  and  Bulgaria,  a  labor  market  safe 
guard clause in the ascension treaties has effectively curtailed the freedom of movement 
and  residency  by  restricting  Bulgarian  and  Romanian  workers’  access  to  the  labor 
markets in most of the older member states.
7 Furthermore, the vision of a EU citizenship 
as  a  potential  “source  of  rights”  (N.  Reich)  in  reality  continues  to  lack  the  social 
dimension,  the  social  rights  associated  with  citizenship  today.  Once  again,  the  noted 
national prerogative when it comes to public policy making has “structurally constrained” 
the development of a EU citizenship (Aziz 2004, p. 112).  
Nevertheless, to the extent that the common market rule of “non-discrimination” 
has begun to determine the actions and interactions of member states when it comes to 
their peoples (nationals and non-nationals alike) and the fact that  social  services and 
social insurance are made available across the EU territory regardless of nationality and 
residency, one is able to note the slow development of a EU-European social space, a 
EU-European society, if you will. Add to this the continuing pressures in the services and 
taxation areas for increasing coordination and unification via either harmonization or at 
least  mutual  recognition  of  standards  and  services,  and  an  evolving  EU-European 
dimension of citizenship, despite set-backs, cannot be denied. 
Thus,  what  has  emerged  since  the  founding  of  the  Union  (Communities)  in 
regards to citizenship reflects the integration problematic itself. The notion of citizenship 
shares with the proclaimed ideal of an “ever closer Union” a contradictory and enabling 
dynamic. Contradictory, because the key to the development of both continues to lie with 
each national member state. Enabling, because the dynamic of integration exposes and 
transcends the limits of the nation state as the existing form of political community (the 
polity) today. 
It is this dynamic that the reader should keep in mind as we begin to discuss the 
concrete case in question. Beginning with contemporary Italian politics, we will see that 
the  assertion  of  the  national  state  principle  increasingly  reflects  rather  anachronistic 
                                                 
7  At  the  time  of  this  writing,  the  restrictions  continue  to  exist  in  the  UK,  Ireland,  Germany,  Austria, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Belgium for another three years. “Three EU states open up to Bulgarian, 
Romanian workers”, EUobserver, January 2, 2009; http://euobserver.com/9/27339. F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  8 
conceptions of the relationship between state and citizenship. Furthermore, while national 
state actors find themselves caught in a EU-European web of their own making, non-
national (sub-national and transnational) actors are finding it increasingly enabling, not to 
say emancipatory, to rely on European integration as both a normative reference point 
and a policy context. 
 
 
2.1 Bringing the State back in – Berlusconi style 
 
On  April  13-14,  2008,  the  Italian  electorate  voted  with  a  clear  majority  for  Silvio 
Berlusconi and his new party, The People of Freedom (Il Popolo della Libertà; PDL), 
and  even  provided  the  Berlusconi  led  party  alliance,  consisting  of  The  People  of 
Freedom, Northern League (Lega Nord) and the new Sicilian Movement for Autonomy 
(Movimento per l’Autonomia del Sud), with an overwhelming victory and clear majorities 
in both Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Silvio Berlusconi, thus, now leads for the 
third time as elected Prime Minister an Italian government (Grasse 2008). 
It  is  fair  to  say  that  most  of  the  rest  of  Europe’s  public  opinion  greeted  the 
Berlusconi IV government (IV because of the reformation of the government without 
new elections in 2005) with an exhausted and befuddled sigh of “not again”. Ever since 
Silvio Berlusconi appeared as a serious contender for the Prime Minister office on the 
Italian political scene, his attraction, his victories, and his comportment in office have led 
to  serious  questions  about  the  state  of  Italian  democracy.  Berlusconi’s  rise  as 
entrepreneur – he is now one of the richest Italians and, arguably most importantly, the 
owner  of  Italy’s  private  television  stations  –  has  been  attributed  by  some  to  Mafia 
connections. Since the 1990s, he has been dogged by various corruption charges and 
attempts at prosecution. Indeed, his late calling as politician has been seen by critical 
observers as an attempt, and a successful one at that, to stave off prosecution first via 
immunity and finally by rewriting laws. His gaffes in office, in turn, have become quite 
legendary. Arguably the most legendary one occurred during a session in the European 
Parliament when he “jokingly” told the German social democratic/socialist MP, Martin F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  9 
Schulz, who had questioned Berlusconi’s democratic credentials, that he, Schulz, would 
make a great overseer (Kapo or capo) of a concentration camp. 
The  disastrous  session  in  the  European  Parliament  (as  Italy’s  Prime  Minister, 
Berlusconi  then  held  the  rotating  Presidency  of  the  EU  Council)  points  to  the  most 
important question mark surrounding Berlusconi’s political role. His business dealings 
and  behavior  in  office  are  in  fact  the  least  of  his  critics’  concerns.  From  the  very 
beginning, his political party, ‘Forward Italy’ (Forza Italia), was not just a vehicle for his 
own personal ambitions. Berlusconi clearly positioned himself and his movement on the 
right of Italy’s political spectrum. From the very beginning – Berlusconi I – he relied on a 
coalition with Italy’s two major right wing parties: the (regional) Northern League of 
Umberto Bossi and the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale), whose main founding 
component  was  the  Italian  Social  Movement  (Movimento  Sociale  Italiano)  of  former 
Mussolini  supporters,  with  Gianfranco  Fini  at  the  helm.  For  the  2008  elections, 
Berlusconi’s Forza and Fini’s Alleanza created the PDL as an electoral alliance, but with 
the prospect (now scheduled for March 2009) of creating a new party out of it. It is this 
clear  positioning  on  the  right,  including  neo-populist,  even  neo-fascist  elements  and 
dimensions, that has led critical observers to sound an alarm regarding Italian democracy 
and that has led many European politicians, including center-right conservatives, to keep 
their distance.
8 
There  are  of  course  many  explanations  for  Berlusconi’s  rise  and  subsequent 
victories in Italian politics. His rise and prominence in Italian politics can be seen as a 
result of the collapse of the Italian political party system in the wake of the large-scale 
corruption scandal, the massive popular protests against and judicial investigations into 
political corruption (Mani Pulite) that gripped Italy in the very early 1990s. In this sense, 
Berlusconi initially used the opportunity that the crisis in Italian politics offered at the 
time and many Italians reacted positively to him and his candidacy precisely because 
both his wealth and his political outsider status were seen as signs of independence from 
a corrupt system and as guarantors of a new beginning. As noted by Alexander Grasse in 
assessing Berlusconi’s third victory, 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that while Fini has managed to disassociate the Alleanza from its fascist roots, the PDL 
continues to have far right currents and members in it. F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  10 
[Berlusconi’s] still unresolved conflict of interest between his political, mass media, and business 
interests  is  viewed  by  many  [Italians]  not  as  a  problem,  but  instead  as  the  very  guarantor  of 
stability and decision-making power – and thus as the solution to the problems (Grasse 2008, p. 
58). 
 
Yet the problems alluded to by Grasse in the above are not the continuing problems of the 
Italian political system itself and are not directly related to the Italian publics’ continuing 
disappointment in its political class. Berlusconi’s third victory, I like to argue instead, is 
the  result  of  a  profound  sense  of  insecurity  associated  with  social  and  economic 
transformations and challenges that the Italian society is facing today. In the first place, 
accounting for Berlusconi’s third victory by pointing to the continuing disenchantment of 
the Italian populace with the political system as such appears less convincing because 
80.5 percent of the Italian electorate still went to the polls. While certainly not a sign of 
reigning satisfaction when considering that Italian elections once upon a time used to 
have a participation rate of 89 percent, 80 percent is still a far cry from the kind of 
disengagement-levels one finds in other European countries, let alone the United States 
of America (Grasse 2008, p. 55).
9 Furthermore, it is also remarkable that the combination 
of Parliamentary, regional, and municipal elections on the same day did not favor, as was 
expected, the Left. Berlusconi’s PDL was especially strong in Italy’s south and also was 
able to be victorious in the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia and won the mayor position 
for the city of Rome (Grasse 2008, p. 57). Indeed, judged by analysts’ expectations and 
also by an outwardly lackluster campaign, Berlusconi’s third victory must appear in its 
clarity as quite a surprise. 
Again, if one wishes to account for Berlusconi’s third victory – and arguably for 
the role that Berlusconi plays in Italian politics today – pointing to a crisis of the political 
system  and  its  politics  as  usual,  although  such  a  crisis  exists,  does  not  provide  the 
necessary leverage. One needs to link the surface (Berlusconi) to the deeper currents that 
at present animate Italian concerns. In public opinion surveys, Italians regularly claimed 
                                                 
9 Even the much-touted (historically significant and internationally admired) 2008 Presidential election in 
the  United  States,  while  drawing  the  highest  turnout  in  forty  years,  amounted  only  to  a  61.1  percent 
electoral participation rate (and  as a side note:  the popular vote for Barack Obama was essentially 53 
percent of votes cast). Megan Thee-Brenan, “Election drew highest turnout in 40 years”, The Caucus Blog, 
The New York Times, December 15, 2008; http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/election-drew-
highest-turnout-in-40-years/?scp=1&sq=Presidential%20election%202008%20voter%20turnout&st=cse 
Election  results  2008,  The  New  York  Times,  November  14,  2008; 
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/president/explorer.html. F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  11 
unemployment, low wages, and high taxes as central concerns. The central issue for the 
majority of Italians (arguably: the average Italian) can be summed up as a concern with 
social and economic security in an economically adverse environment saddled with a 
public environment that is seen as corrupt and inefficient. 
This structural problematic and its concomitant feeling of insecurity gained some 
concrete “faces” during 2007-2008. Corruption and inefficiency became enshrined in the 
sprawling garbage heaps lining the curbs and spilling into the streets of Italy’s southern 
towns and cities including, most famously, Naples. Another representation became the 
murder of a 47-year-old Italian woman by a young Rom on October 30, 2007. Suddenly, 
the issue of immigrants, and especially of Italy’s Roma population, gained a heightened 
urgency and Italian citizens (and the tabloid press) began to ask questions in terms of 
“us”  versus  “them”.  Walter  Veltroni,  then  mayor  of  Rome  where  the  murder  had 
occurred and who would soon become the national candidate of the Center-Left coalition 
in the elections, coined the term “Romania emergency” and warned Romania that if it 
wanted to remain in the European Union it should stop the flow of those immigrants. At 
least  one  attack  on  Roma  by  neo-fascists  was  reported  in  the  international  press  as 
immediate reaction to the October murder.
10 That Italy has become one of the major 
destinations for Romanians (already in the past but now in the context of EU membership 
and with Italy one of the few older EU members granting full freedom of movement), 
that Italy has a Roma population, that extreme poverty exists and encourages (mostly 
petty) crime, and that Italy is also one of the central destinations for illegal immigration 
to Europe (south/southeastern route via the greater Mediterranean area), and last but not 
least,  how  migration  in  general  has  impacted  and  transformed  Italy’s  society  and 
economy and the actual plight of most migrant workers – all of those rather complex 
issues and questions suddenly became reduced to a security threat and had a “face”, the 
Roma (Andall 2007). 
Thus, while insecurity and doubt about Italy’s present state of affairs did not rank 
high themselves in Italians’ responses to questions about their concerns, Berlusconi’s 
                                                 
10  Alexander  Smoltczyk,  “Italien:  Krieg  gegen  die  Hütten:  Nach  dem  Mord  an  einer  Spaziergängerin 
entdecken die Italiener den ‘Rumänien-Notstand’: Einwanderer aus Südosteuropa, die Dank großzügiger 
Gesetze  im  Land  sind”,  Der  Spiegel,  46/2007  (November  12,  2007); 
http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/dokument/dokument-druck.html?id=53621840&top=SPIEGEL. F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  12 
third victory is the result of the Italian public’s pronounced uneasiness in the face of 
rather complex challenges. Challenges, one should note, that are mediated by the Italian 
Republic’s  continuing  modernization  problematic  as  a  national  state  with  two  broad 
regional  cleavages,  North  and  South,  yet  that  are  rooted  in  the  contradictory  and 
problematic history of modernization in Italy throughout the 20
th century.
11 While the 
Democratic Party (Partito Democratico) with Walter Veltroni as its candidate actually 
had fundamental change as one of its campaign slogans, such fundamental change is 
neither  easy  for  many  Italians  to  understand  nor  in  fact  to  condone.  Berlusconi’s 
personalized politics, his entertainer charm (or, depending on one’s view, his pathetic 
attempts at such), in this sense is his major asset. Voters are free to associate him, il 
Cavaliere (the Knight), with their own conservative longings and to remember only the 
good parts (such as his singing and tax cuts), while easily blocking out the blunders and 
the continuing problems.
12 
And as such, Berlusconi’s third term as elected Prime Minister, like his two terms 
before, advances a rather symbolic politics.
13 But this “symbolism” should not be viewed 
as without any foundation or purpose. Quite on the contrary. Berlusconi’s symbolism is 
markedly on the far right, emphasizing security versus insecurity, blaming the Left for 
everything, and marshalling a vision (however ill defined) of Italian greatness. In short, 
what has already been pointed out in the above needs to be emphasized again: Berlusconi 
has decidedly positioned himself on the right in Italian politics and his coalition, with the 
exit  of  Casini’s  Union  of  Christian  and  Center  Democrats  (Unione  dei  Democratici 
Cristiani e di Centro) more so than before, is a coalition of the Italian far right. (That this 
coalition  is  explainable  and  works  in  terms  of  the  destruction  and  absence  of  the 
organized traditional center, i.e. Christian Democracy, in contemporary Italian politics is 
a different story). 
                                                 
11  There  is  a  distinctly  southern  European  problematic  of  modernization  at  work  here  which  links  in 
Rokkanian  fashion  the  cleavages  of  town/country,  religious/secular,  agrarian/industrial, 
communal/national,  tradition/modernity.  A  problematic  perhaps  best  characterized  as  an  unfinished 
modernization in a postmodern context.. 
12 In attempting to explain Berlusconi and his (strange) attraction, I have been reminded numerous times of 
former US President Ronald Reagan, which Berlusconi would probably take as a great compliment. Both 
certainly share an appreciation of the theatrical element in politics; Berlusconi’s theater, however, is not the 
Hollywood sound stage. 
13 First cabinet meeting was held in Naples to demonstrate concern with the southern garbage crisis; one 
might call the meeting an attempt at “consecration”. F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  13 
At  the  first  cabinet  meeting,  several  policy  measures  were  introduced  that 
combined aimed to present an anti-crime package. Among the measures were tougher 
immigration laws allowing for the incarceration of illegal immigrants and DNA testing of 
immigrants wishing to join family members already living in Italy. Moreover, as the 
International  Herald  Tribune  noted,  the  new  measures  would  also  negatively  affect 
citizens from other EU member states residing in Italy, as they would now have to prove 
that  “they  have  a  job,  health  insurance  and  adequate  living  conditions.”
14  Berlusconi 
introduced the measures with the following words: 
“The state has to return to being the state … The security measures will allay the fear that citizens 
have … It is their [citizens’] right not to be afraid anymore.”
15 
 
The reader should note that the programmatic message actually advances a definition of 
citizenship, the state and their relations. At first glance, the message might appear simple, 
namely, the national state as protector of its citizens. However, as such, the national state 
also defines citizenship in terms of who is/is not a citizen. As is well known, in the 
European tradition of national-state formation, that definition is based on the idea of a 
national  “people”.  I  will  return  to  this  point  below.  What  one  might  overlook  in 
Berlusconi’s pronouncement is the particular relationship between citizens and state. 
Citizens have the right “not to be afraid”, to feel secure. The state has the duty to 
“ally the fear”, to protect its citizens. While the citizens by implication are identified as 
nationals – namely as citizens of the Italian state – the vision of citizenship advanced is 
solely a passive one. Conversely, the state in this vision is the active entity – it is the 
absence of activity that constitutes the absence of the state – and its activity is clearly 
viewed as concerning “law and order”. It is perhaps unfair to read too much into (any) 
programmatic statement. Nevertheless, I would like to stress that underlying Berlusconi’s 
wording,  whether  he  would  agree  with  it  or  not,  lies  an  entire  tradition  of  political 
thought on the state and its (non-)relation to citizenship. 
The  tradition  upon  which  Berlusconi,  again  perhaps  willy-nilly,  draws  can  be 
identified as Hobbesian. It is characterized by a strong vision of the state as the provider 
and enforcer of public order. In this tradition, there are in fact no citizens, only subjects. 
                                                 
14  “Berlusconi  unveils  anti-crime  measures  for  Italy”,  International  Herald  Tribune,  May  21,  2008; 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/21/europe/italy.php; last accessed: September 13, 2008. 
15 “Berlusconi unveils anti-crime measures for Italy”, International Herald Tribune, May 21, 2008. F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  14 
The right that Berlusconi invokes – the right not to be afraid – is the Hobbesian right of 
subjects as wardens of the state. In order to fulfill the role of a warden, the state, in turn, 
must be the guarantor and protector of security; it must itself be a “security state”.
16 
There  is  a  clear  divide  here  between  “citizens”  and  “state”.  The  central  function  of 
protection and security provides the state with absolute defining power in this regard. 
Berlusconi’s advocated return is one in which the state turns into a “pater familias” (head 
of the household) and citizens are returned to the status of frightened children. The family 
context, in turn, does not allow other meanings of citizenship to enter the vision and the 
state is clearly defined in time and place. The implication, some might call it the logical 
conclusion, is that the state ends up defining its role only in terms of itself. The provision 
and enforcement of public order turns into the state’s interest in its own stability and 
survival. This should give one pause when considering the democratic credentials of the 
nation-state in this regard, a point to which I will return shortly. 
It is therefore quite logical that Berlusconi’s advocated return of the state has as 
one  of  its  central  policy  measures  a  census  of  the  Italian  Roma  population.  While 
censuses are today mostly seen in the context of data gathering for public policy making 
(a state needs to know about the population living within its territory), there has always 
been the suspicion that this type of population data gathering also can be used to control a 
population. In this more critical view, the administrative state is closely linked to the 
surveillance  state  (the  “big  brother”  of  1984)  and  by  implication  to  the  Hobbesian 
security  state  tradition.  Public  order  in  order  to  be  achieved  needs  “objective” 
information (the facts). Those facts are especially needed about all that is or could be 
potentially threatening to the public order. 
For the Roma to become the quasi-catalyst for and addressee of this vision was 
not  at  all  accidental.  There  is,  so  to  say,  a  foundation  to  build  on  and  it  is  to  this 
foundation that I will now turn. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 In its classical Neo-Marxist formulation, the term security state designated the articulation of “welfare” 
and “surveillance/policing” functions of the state in late Fordism (Hirsch 1980). F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  15 
2.2 The Roma paradigm 
 
It is estimated that there are around 150,000 Roma living in Italy today. Of those, it is 
further estimated that “about half of them are Italian citizens, while 20-25% are from 
European Union countries, chiefly Romania. Most Roma live in the Northern parts of the 
country” (European Roma Rights Center 2008, p. 9). Italy’s entire population today is 
estimated at almost 60 million. To put the Roma population number even further into 
perspective, there are anywhere between 6 to 11 million Roma, Sinti, and Travellers 
living in the world, about 5 to slightly over 9 million in Europe, with the largest EU-
European Roma population, anywhere from 535,140 to 2.5 million, living in Romania. 
Whichever number one reckons with, Italy’s Roma population is clearly among the very 
smallest.
17 
Yet numbers or “hard data” – reality (or rather: realities) – have never been the 
issue in the relations between Roma, Sinti, and Travellers and the societies they travelled 
through  and  lived  in.  It  has  always  been  the  assumption  of  a  certain  “presence”, 
encapsulated in the evocative term “gypsy”, that has guided those relations. Thus, in 
order to come to terms with why an estimated 150,000 people in a population of almost 
60 million have elicited such a strong response, it is fruitful to ask what exactly has made 
and continues to make Roma, Sinti, and Travellers into both such an identifiable and 
identifiably “different” population.
18  Indeed, when asked about the then existing tensions 
between Italy and Romania, some (ethnic) Romanian interview partners maintained that 
                                                 
17  It  is  notoriously  difficult  to  provide  an  accurate  headcount  of  any  population.  The  difficulties  are 
compounded in the case of ethnic identification, which is usually done via self-identification in census data 
collection and therefore turns even more problematic in the case of Roma, Sinti and Traveller populations 
where the identity clearly carries a stigma within the broader society (Zamfir and Zamfir 1993, pp. 52-56). 
If one uses official census data or highest estimate numbers, Turkey has the largest Roma population in 
Europe and therefore the world (yes, this author counts Turkey as European). For Romanian data, see table 
40, Recensământul Popula￿ ie ￿ i al Locuin￿ elor 2002, available from the Romanian National Institute of 
Statistics (INSSE) at: http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/vol1/tabele/t40.pdf. A good overview of 
the population data (census and estimates from various sources) is provided by the Wikipedia entry for 
“Romani people” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romani_people. As usual, even with serious Wikipedia 
entries data and numbers should be rechecked. The 3-5 million estimate given at one point in the entry 
write-up for Turkey is a fantasy number: the Christian Science Monitor article cited in support uses this 
estimate  on  its  page  2  without  any  indication  where  that  number  came  from,  see: 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0609/p20s01-woeu.html?page=1. 
18 The term Roma refers to a specific community (albeit the largest one) within the larger population and 
will  continue  to be used  exclusively for the purposes of  this paper, unless required by context and/or 
analytic point to be made (see text further below). F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  16 
the Roma were in fact “a European problem”.
19 And there is some truth in that assertion. 
However, that truth, as will become clear below, can hardly serve as an excuse for the 
Italian government’s measures and the Romanian government’s initial lack of concern 
about those measures. While I will address in the next section the Romanian context, the 
present section aims to come to terms with what is behind the so-called “problem”. 
The  very  language  of  a  “problem”  one  should  note  underlies  and  legitimizes 
policies  of  “othering”  –  from  neglect  to  abuse  and  beyond  –  and  as  such  in  fact 
obfuscates the complex realities that are at issue. In the first place, one needs to point out 
that all European societies have historically not been hospitable to “the gypsies”, with 
suspicion and persecutions as the norm, leading in fact to one of the (almost) forgotten 
chapters in Germany’s National Socialist population control and extermination policies 
(Fraser 1992, pp. 257-270). Furthermore, hidden from view through this othering are the 
people  themselves,  their  actual  existence,  the  existing  differences,  and  the  specific 
problems. What has been termed “the gypsies” and the individual figure of “the gypsy” 
(either  in  its  male  or  female  version)  as  identity  templates  actually  refuse  to  accept 
difference.  The  designated/labeled  population  in  reality  falls  into  numerous  groups, 
tribes, and families whose members can and do live under a variety of circumstances. 
Besides the broad distinction between Roma (eastern and southeastern Europe) and Sinti 
(western;  mostly  German  speaking  areas)  one  encounters  the  Manouche  (France  and 
French language areas), the Cale and Gitanos (Spain and southern France), the Ciganos 
(Portugal) and various smaller groups in Western and Northern Europe and a pastiche of 
smaller  (Roma)  group-divisions  across  southeastern  Europe  (including  Hungary). 
Dialects, family relations, settlement patterns, and vocations account for and mark the 
differences that the Romani people acknowledge among themselves (Fraser 1992, pp. 
290-299). This variety can and does include various degrees of what is referred to as 
“integration”  –  in  its  usually  simplistic  fashion:  the  condition  in  which  individual 
members are not (easily) recognized anymore as members of a specific group identity 
and/or in which the group identity has become a folkloric pastime. In this sense, the 
                                                 
19 That one was able to notice considerable exacerbation in the voices of my ethnic Romanian interview 
partners when asked about the issue should be noted already as a sign of what will be discussed in this 
paper further below.  F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  17 
process of othering creates a monolithic entity out of multiple presences, their realities, 
and their specific problems. 
The truly unsettling power of othering, however, lies in the fact that it is the basis 
for prejudicial views that in the event become enshrined in attitudes and public policies, 
and  thereby  create  prejudice-reinforcing  realities.  Historically,  this  mechanism  is  of 
course well known and documented in all cases of so-called minority groups. In the case 
of the travelling families, dubbed “gypsies” in English, who entered west-central Europe 
from the southeast and east in the early to mid 15
th century, the then existing socio-
economic institutions assigned to them particular leftover roles that could not help but 
reinforce the imagery of the “fahrendes Volk” (travelling people): 
…the guilds regulated crafts and trades, commerce was also tightly controlled, and peasants were 
not in the habit of employing casual labour, so what was left for Gypsies as a livelihood was 
limited to small services and minor trading and entertainment (Fraser 1992, p. 81). 
 
The  particular  socio-economic  place  assigned  to  those  travelling  families,  while 
reinforcing  the  imagery,  does  not  in  itself  explain  the  political-cultural  impact  the 
families had on those societies, an impact that led to the creation of the gypsy image and 
imagery. What is missing from the socio-economic diagnosis of “leftover roles” is the 
realization of the profound changes that had begun to transform the western European 
political and socio-economic landscape at the time. For present purposes, it is enough to 
remind the reader that the early to mid-15
th century, the late Middle Ages leading into the 
Renaissance, was a period in which the pastiche of Medieval “overlapping authorities” 
(H. Bull) gave way to centralized states, settlement patterns became differentiated into 
town/country fault lines, a new commercial order was on the rise, and an age of discovery 
was about to be ushered in. After the rather tumultuous 14
th century, the 15
th century saw 
Europe not only recover, but, at least in its western parts, set out on the road we now 
associate with the term “modernity”. It is in the context of these crucial changes that one 
needs to place the advent and “discovery” of the travelling families. 
For  centuries,  “Europe”  had  been  a  wide-open  space,  defined  and  made  by 
successive waves of migration, fluctuating internal settlement patterns, and decentralized 
(not  to  say  disorganized)  political  authority.  The  curiosity  with  which  the  travelling 
families were initially viewed, the defining question of their religious belonging (heathen F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  18 
or baptized), the letters of protected passage they (usually) received from authorities, all 
attest to the fact that they initially were not seen as completely alien in their way of life. 
Indeed, the travelling families themselves were able to claim the conventions of the times 
(pilgrimages, atonement) for being accepted, for receiving safe passage, and for receiving 
money (given as alms to them). Even the initial imagery itself drew on what Europeans 
thought they knew at the time: the “eastern lands” as point of origin, and the Tartars as 
closest (and, of course, negative) comparison in appearance. Although the comparison to 
the Tartars already points to a decidedly negative impression (but one should note the 
historical difference – the invading, powerful “God’s scourge” – in this sense), magic and 
especially future telling did not negatively impact the impression. On the contrary, at a 
time in which Christian belief, science, and magic still interacted freely in an everyday 
manner, fortune telling was an accepted activity and was highly, even officially, sought 
out (Fraser 1992, pp. 60-84).
20 
The encounter became unsettling to the western Europeans, the more they began 
to  see  themselves  as  settled,  the  more  spatial  boundaries  became  politically-
administratively accepted, and the more political authorities were actually able to create 
and enforce a public order on their territories. What had been seen before as part of a 
lived  experience  became  alien,  even  threatening:  an  echo  of  a  past  that  western 
Europeans were leaving behind. Moreover, in the centuries that were to follow the first 
encounters, not being settled, having no “home” in the sense of a continuous place of 
settlement, and travelling freely the countryside instead became associated with the worst 
aspects of life experiences: war, brigandism, crime, and poverty. It did not help that the 
accepted, lived relations between Christian belief, science, and magic became shattered 
and were replaced with a rationalized (purged) Christianity, on the one hand, and an 
adherence to a rational, empirical scientific method, on the other. Magic became trickery 
and as such was regarded either with shame (by those who still consulted a fortune teller) 
and disdain and was persecuted (purged) by the authorities. The idea of a public order 
and the perceived and experienced threats to that public order began to determine the 
image and imagery of “gypsies”. Physical differences, especially the dark skin, became 
the outwardly visible signs of, and a powerful trigger mechanism for, the imagery itself. 
                                                 
20 For a general history and discussion, see Kieckhefer (2000). F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  19 
This development of the image and imagery of “the gypsies” and “the gypsy” in 
relation to the public order only intensified with the three “revolutions”, the democratic, 
the national, and the industrial, of what E. J. Hobsbawm has called “the long nineteenth 
century”. With the creation of national states and industrial societies, there was no social 
space anymore for travelling families: national states drew on a recognized and united 
territory with stable populations for legitimacy and support, while the new capitalism 
created  class  relations  based  on  ownership,  markets,  and  contracts.  Rationality  and 
reason, in turn, became the cultural foundations of the new public order. While in earlier 
centuries, the western European imagination could still draw on some lived experiences 
for some instances of recognition and acceptance, the new public order that developed in 
(western and central) Europe cast “gypsies” and “the gypsy” into the role of the complete 
other. 
Thus, what “the gypsy” life represents today is an alternative paradigm to the 
nationalized and modernized existence in the European political and social space. The act 
of travelling in this context signifies more than just a mere movement from a point A to a 
point B. It is outside of the recognized time/space linearity with its defined reasons (the 
business trip, the pleasure cruise) and as such represents a challenge not only to the 
existing political and social boundaries, but to the very conception of what it means to be 
modern and what it means to be European. The contemporary Italian view underlines 
this, as “nomads” has become an often-used term, including in government circles, to 
describe  the  Roma  population.
21  As  nomads,  the  Roma  are  seen  as  having  more  in 
common  with  African  tribal  herdsmen  than  with  Italian  citizens.  The  Italian  policy-
reaction in this sense not only can be seen as drawing on the Hobbesian tradition of the 
security state, but in fact also reproduces some of the key measures in European national 
state formation: population identification and control via a census and assertion of control 
over a defined territory as social space via policing, all in the name of public order and 
security (Silver 2005). 
                                                 
21 “All’UE anche il rapporto sul censimento dei campi nomadi – Rifugiati: il governo approva il decreto” 
(also therein cited Interior Minister Maroni using the term nomads), Corriere della Sera, August 1, 2008; 
http://www.corriere.it/politica/08_agosto_01/rifugiati_decreto_ue_0d29b4fe-5fb4-11dd-8d8f-
00144f02aabc.shtml. F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  20 
At  this  point,  the  interrelations  of  the  argument  developed  thus  far  begin  to 
crystallize. As noted, the European Union has become a united and as such wide-open 
space in which the national boundaries in principle, but depending on policy area, have 
ceased to exist. The development of a EU-European citizenship in this wide-open context 
relies heavily on non-nationally bound forces: normative commitments, market relations, 
multi-level governance, and integration through law. It would therefore be tempting to 
conclude  at  this  point  that  Berlusconi’s  advocated  return  of  the  state  is  a  deeply 
anachronistic and as such flawed construct and that the Roma in fact are part and parcel 
of  what  it  means  to  be  European  today,  including  the  challenge  that  their  non-
nationalized  identity  presents  to  the  still  existing  national-state  framework  within  the 
Union. The historical irony in this development should not be lost. Indeed, before going 
into a general concluding perspective, it bears to discuss the Romanian side of the Roma 
paradigm. As will be shown, the historical irony only deepens. 
The non-nationalized, non-modernized identity – again: an alternative paradigm 
in the creation of a European political and social space – one might simply suppose also 
guides the (ethnic) Romanian response to the Roma as a “problem”. As the EU-member 
state with the largest Roma population, one might surmise that in Romania the dynamic 
of othering is especially relevant and potentially especially virulent in its negative impact 
on Romanian/Roma relations. While this is the case, it is not all that needs to be pointed 
out in the Romanian case. What follows is a discussion that aims to explain both: the 
initial lack of a national-political response to the Italian measures and the way in which 
the Romanian response was finally framed. 
 
 
2.3 Romanian realities 
 
Romanian President Traian Basescu’s response to the Italian measures came at a press 
conference after his crisis visit to Rome: F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  21 
Romanian citizens, irrespective of their ethnic background, are citizens of the European Union… 
They [Roma] are our citizens…  Romanian citizens are citizens of the European Union and are to 
be treated according to the standards of the European Union.
22 
 
At first glance, the response might read wonderfully inclusionary, full of that peculiar 
European promise which has animated the debate about European integration in general 
and the EU’s eastern enlargement in particular. However, upon closer inspection, one 
cannot  help  but  realize  a  peculiar  double  formulation,  which  the  speaker  apparently 
deemed necessary in order for his claim to be properly understood. First, Roma receive 
their identity and rights only by their identification as Romanian citizens. Furthermore, in 
its  paternalistic  formulation  (“[t]hey  are  our  citizens”  [emphasis  added]),  the 
identification cannot help but turn Roma into wardens of the Romanian state and not 
citizens in the modern, active sense of the term. Indeed, throughout the press conference, 
Basescu in his responses accepted that there was a “Roma problem”, even to the point of 
offering the Italian government help in dealing with it. 
At  the  same  time,  Romanians  themselves  apparently  are  in  need  of  a  larger 
identification in order to justify and achieve an identity and protective rights: “Romanian 
citizens  are  citizens  of  the  European  Union  and  are  to  be  treated  according  to  the 
standards of the European Union”. To put it more sharply, not only do Roma receive their 
identity and rights in the context of a granted belonging, but also the very identity and 
rights of Romanians as citizens of the European Union has to be asserted in order to make 
the claim for the Roma population in question. 
This double formulation, I now wish to argue, points us to a peculiar Romanian 
political-cultural insecurity about the claim/status of Romanian membership within the 
Union. As discussed in the above, from a formal-legal standpoint a European Union 
citizenship  simply  does  not  exist.  Citizenship  continues  to  be  based  in,  defined  and 
legitimized  by  each  member  state  as  a  matter  of  a  decidedly  nationally  defined 
sovereignty and membership. However, citizenship has also become part of “integration 
by stealth” (Majone 2005) and both Community and intergovernmental regulation have 
spilled over into the dimension of citizenship as defined through rights. 
                                                 
22  Press  conference  with  Berlusconi  during  Basescu’s  visit  in  Rome,  July  31,  2008; 
http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=10108&_PRID=ag.  “Roma –  Basescu:  Romania does 
not approve Italian Measures,” AGI News On, July 31, 2008; http://www.agi.it/english-version/italy/elenco-
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If the policies related to and based on the four freedoms within the Union can be 
said to ground a EU-citizenship, then Romania (and also Bulgaria) received from the 
beginning a rather exclusionary treatment in this regard. Romanian citizens do not yet 
enjoy the freedom of movement and residency in respect to the majority of older EU 
member states that all other member state citizens possess. Furthermore, Romania was 
placed under monitoring in Justice and Home affairs matters as widespread and high-
level corruption in conjunction with organized crime were identified by the Union as 
issues  lacking  crucial  initiatives  and  reforms.  And  besides  corruption  and  organized 
crime, the treatment of orphaned and street children and the position and treatment of 
ethnic  minorities  in  Romania  have  been  and  continue  to  be  key  concerns  in 
Romanian/EU relations. 
(Ethnic) Romanian interview partners were quick to point out that they did not 
experience or are not experiencing prejudicial treatment within the institutions and the 
policy process of the Union, and I see no reason to completely distrust that response. For 
by and large, the institutions and the process are known to be more Europeanized than 
they  usually  receive  credit  for.  Policy-  and  expert-driven  in  its  internal  dealings  and 
consensus-oriented  at  the  national  level,  there  simply  is  no  room  in  Brussels  for  a 
personalized venting of prejudicial, let alone racist, attitudes. Such attitudes would in 
effect  immediately  disqualify their  proponent, making  it  harder,  if  not impossible,  to 
influence process and policy-outcomes. Also, to be clear at this point, Romania, even 
almost 20 years after the toppling of the Ceausescu regime in 1989, continues to be 
plagued by fundamental problems. Corruption in Romania exists at the highest levels and 
is in general a debilitating problem for the country. As one of the by far poorest member 
states, all social services in Romania continue to suffer, which obviously continues to 
affect  negatively  all  those  in  society  that  need  help  the  most.  There  can  also  be  no 
question that the Roma as an ethnic minority group continues to suffer from both neglect 
and prejudice, with poverty and acts of violent treatment by both ordinary citizens and 
public authorities as consequences; a status that differs fundamentally from the status of 
other  ethnic  minority  groups  in  Romania.  In  short,  an  objective  dimension  to  the 
treatment of Romania as a new member state within the EU exists that needs to be at least F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  23 
acknowledged before passing any concerned judgment about prejudicial and exclusionary 
EU measures against Romania in this regard. 
Having  acknowledged  that  there  is  an  objective  dimension  to  the  issue  of 
Romania’s treatment as a new member state, one is still left with a peculiar dimension to 
the issue. It has been easy, all-too-easy, in this case for older member states and European 
Union policy-makers to claim special concerns. From the very beginning, namely the 
“bloody revolution” of 1989 that toppled the Ceausescu regime, Romanian/EU-European 
relations were conducted under the shadow of a decidedly problematic, negative image 
that Romania had acquired over time in the western and central part of Europe.
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The basics of this negative image – indeed: the very imagery – are well known. 
Since  Bram  Stoker’s  confused  geography  and  topography  and  his  Victorian 
transformation of folklore, not just Transylvania, but Romania have come to stand for the 
“Balkans” itself as “one of the wildest and least known portions of Europe” (Stoker 1979, 
p. 10) replete with strange cultural practices, superstitious peasants, and abject poverty 
(and, naturally, those bloodthirsty monsters). In the historical process of getting to know 
Romania better, the initial, Victorian imagery was easily transferred onto the plane of 
developmental differences and as such became part of what was seen as differentiating 
the “Balkans” and the entire “Eastern Europe” from the West (Wagner 2002). 
What  needs  to  be  emphasized  about  this  negative  imagery  for  our  present 
purposes is the imagery surrounding the people itself. Popular imagery in Central and 
Western Europe did not make any distinctions between the “gypsy” type and a Romanian 
type. If the first encounters with the travelling families (see above) were governed by the 
negative physiognomic image of “Tartars”,” the type of the dark haired, dark skinned, 
“swarthy” (or Moorish) people was quickly extended to the Romanians (or in its original 
historical use: the Vlachs) as well. This image in fact has kept itself alive and well even 
after the fall of the Ceausescu regime and the opening of the Cold War border. Indeed, as 
numerous instances of mass media coverage and the popular imagination have proven, 
the monolithic image connection gypsy/Romanian continues to be made. This, of course, 
again counters the realities and the differences behind such a term as “gypsies”. But this 
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identification has also proven to be a (traditional and recurring) thorn in the self-image of 
Romanians. 
The  “gypsy”  has  become  the  negative  “other”  in  this  sense,  the  bearer  of  all 
negative associations, and as such the reflection of the imposed (and enforced) otherness 
of  Western  making.  Demarcating  a  Romanian  identity  from  the  “gypsy”  image  is 
therefore,  willy-nilly,  a  recurring  topos  in  Romanian  politics  and  culture.  This 
relationship does not excuse the treatment of the Roma population in Romania. However, 
it helps to decipher the Romanian reaction to the Italian policy-measures against the 
Italian Roma population through the cultural context in which the reaction took (had to 
take) place. 
At issue for and in the Romanian reaction was the constitution of a “people”. The 
Italian Roma population was not immediately recognized (even in parts) as Romanian 
citizens. The differentiation between a Romanian identity and a “gypsy” identity has 
made  it  difficult  to  acknowledge  citizenship  as  such  an  acknowledgement  would 
retransfer the negative “other” into the self. Yet the Italian policy measures ultimately 
forced such an identification precisely because they concerned and threatened the rights 
associated  with  citizenship  and  thereby  in  effect  did  not  make  a  distinction  between 
“gypsy” and “Romanian”. As President Basescu’s noted reaction points out, the Italian 
measures questioned in the end the Romanian citizens’ standing inside the Union as co-
equals  to  the  citizens  of  all  other  member  states  and  the  Romanian  state’s  ability  to 
protect its citizens both in bilateral relations and in EU affairs. 
Given  the  problem  of  the  constitution  of  a  people  in  the  Romanian  case,  the 
Romanian  reaction  transferred  the  problem  onto  the  EU-European  plane.  While  the 
national identity-discourse is (still) unable to acknowledge the Roma as members of the 
national community, citizenship as a EU-European rights discourse grounded in Treaty 
obligations  was  able  to  sidestep  that  difference  and  to  assert  the  principle  of  non-
discrimination. At the same time, reverting to citizenship as a EU principle allowed for 
the difference to be reasserted as a matter of substance. Citizenship for Romanians could 
be  protected  and  the  “Roma  problem”  could  still  be  acknowledged  –  as  a  European 
problem,  thereby  avoiding  any  (all-too-close)  identification  with  Romania  and 
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The Romanian case thereby leads us quite naturally to a general (re-)consideration 
of citizenship as part and parcel of the European integration project. For if citizenship 
tied to each national member state presents us with political-cultural limitations grounded 
in  the  principle  of  the  national  as  an  essentialist  interpretation  of  a  “people”,  the 
Europeanization of citizenship, instead of threatening nation-state capacities, could be 
considered a way out of what is an increasingly anachronistic contraption. 
 
 
3. Conclusion: The Poverty of European Citizenship  
 
This essay began with a clash between Italy and Romania during the summer and early 
autumn of 2008 over the treatment of Roma in Italy. The notion of citizenship clearly 
played the decisive part. Both Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Romanian 
President  Traian  Basescu,  as  quoted  already  in  the  above,  summoned  the  term  in 
defending their respective interventions, Berlusconi to defend the policies, Basescu to 
criticize them. Yet in their respective responses, one finds two different reference points. 
For Berlusconi, citizens are clearly nationals; Basescu, in turn, emphasizes the European 
Union as context and standard-bearer of citizenship. Both, however, unfortunately were 
not far apart in their respective assessments of a Roma “problem”. The difference in their 
reference points and the shared view of the Roma brings out a fundamental fissure in the 
construction of a EU-European citizenship. 
The Italian policy measures that triggered the clash were taken in response to 
increased concerns by the Italian populace over issues of crime and immigration. Yet the 
Italian policy measures relied on a Hobbesian vision of the security state and targeted a 
specific population group exclusively and therefore both vision and policy are at odds 
with  a  dynamic  of  EU  integration  build  on  transnational  normative  commitments 
(including non-discrimination), market relations, multi-level governance, and the rule of 
law. That the Roma became the exclusive target was, however, no accident – it was the 
logical outcome of a historical relationship that, in word and deed, continues to make 
Roma into a specific “problem”: a population defined essentially as (at least potential) 
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Roma “problem”, yet one also encounters another dimension in this case. If the view of 
the Roma as a “problem” is shared, in the Romanian case it is also a view defined by 
Romanian political-cultural insecurities about a second-class citizenship for Romanians 
themselves; bluntly put, the “other” in this case hits too close to home. 
I would now like to drive the argument a bit further. This necessitates putting the 
discussions above into an even larger perspective. It also necessitates noting some issues 
that need to be addressed, issues that some might find too problematic. But flinching in 
the  face  of  complexity  and/or  controversy  has  never  been  part  of  the  occupational 
description of the political and social sciences. 
Among the most powerful and recurring criticisms of the European Union is the 
charge that the Union suffers from a democratic “deficit”. At issue in this diagnosis are 
two interrelated dimensions that are routinely identified as creating democracy in the 
contemporary polity: popular sovereignty as the only basis of legitimate government and 
popular representation as the only basis of securing the people’s voice and interests in 
day-to-day  governing  decisions.  Both  dimensions  are  seen  as  deficient  in  the  Union. 
There  is  no  European  populus  as  such,  critics  proclaim,  that  would  fit  the  bill  of  a 
sovereign. Instead, the European people continue to be, and see themselves as, divided 
along national boundaries (the British, the French, the Germans, …). And for exactly this 
condition,  the  existing  representational  mechanisms  within  the  EU  system  are  either 
problematic or simply (still) too weak. The Council structure in this view only confirms 
and  reproduces  European  integration  as  an  elite-driven  project  and  the  European 
Parliament continues to be too weak in its role and influence. 
While one can (and should) dispute the characterization of EU institutions, there 
is  actually  a  sleight  of  hand  at  work  in  the  democratic  deficit  criticism.  The  central 
assumption on which the argument is based and from which all of its persuasive force is 
derived, is the assumption that the national state is and continues to be the only legitimate 
and the only functioning form for a democratic polity. Historically, the argument appears 
to be sound, if one forgets about all those instances in which nationalism (or patriotism) 
ran amok. The great historical achievement of the idea of the nation-state and its reality, 
the national-state, in this sense (and again discounting the negative) has been to create 
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institutional sources and resources for democratic rule. Nations made modern citizens and 
national-states made modern democracies. It is the implicit comparison between national-
state and European Union, a comparison in which the Union is then explicitly found 
lacking the key democratic credentials of “people” and “representation”, from which the 
democratic deficit criticism derives its force. 
Yet one needs to ask today if national states, and especially including EU member 
states, are so much better at providing and caring for democracy. As Bob Jessop has 
suggested: 
if there is a democratic deficit in the European Union, it may be linked to the contemporary form 
of statehood more generally, with deficits on different scales reinforcing each other (Jessop 2004, 
p. 56). 
 
This essay, if anything, has certainly made Jessop’s case for a larger and as such more 
problematic democratic “deficit”. In the first place, we have seen that the central point on 
which both Italian policy measures and Romanian reaction converged and hinged on is 
the vision of a national state and its people. Yet in both cases, the vision itself was found 
to  be  highly  problematic.  In  the  Italian  case,  the  state  protects  at  the  price  of  key 
democratic principles: non-discrimination and an emancipated citizenry. The Romanian 
case,  in  turn,  serves  to  remind  us  that  the  very  conception  of  a  people  relies  in  its 
essentialist conception of a national identity on a mechanism of inclusion/exclusion that 
compromises the democratic principle itself. 
An  answer  that  emerges  from  this  essay  is  therefore  that  the  solution  to  the 
democratic deficit in the European Union is not to be sought in the realm of member state 
competencies.  Instead,  the  solution  to  the  democratic  deficit  lies  in  the  continuing 
Europeanization of citizenship. To strengthen democracy in and across the EU area, a 
EU-European notion of citizenship has to be taken up in earnest, defended and extended 
– precisely in defense of democratic principles against their undermining by member 
states and against a nationalized policy process that still values political-administrative 
elites over citizens. In short, the solution in this sense lies in Brussels, and not in London, 
Paris, Berlin, or in Rome or Bucharest. 
This, in fact, is a lesson that so-called minority groups, including Sinti, Roma, and 
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been spun around European integration in order to rally populations, legitimize public 
policies and (yes) also in expression of the vision of a united, peaceful Europe, is now the 
web that member states find themselves in when creating and administering rights. It is a 
web  that  enables  both  citizens  and  minority  groups  to  challenge  national  policies  by 
taking their case to Brussels (or, not forgetting, to The Hague). For a heterogeneous 
group such as Sinti, Roma, and Travelers, Europe has certainly proven to be a rallying 
point. One might even propose that the new Europe is actually aiding in the creation of 
something like a unified identity in this case. 
Yet the Europeanization of citizenship also has its price. And we can again turn to 
the Roma dimension of the essay, indeed to the dimension of the “travelling families”, in 
order to see this price clearly. The opening of traditional national borders in the context 
of European integration should not be misconstrued as a return to the European space of 
the Middle Ages (pace H. Bull). Instead, as noted, the openness presented is the result of 
and  as  such  regulated  by  market  mechanisms;  the  four  freedoms  are  not  political 
freedoms, but socio-economic freedoms. Only the consequences of those four market-
centered freedoms can be said to have led to the slow emergence of a EU-European 
citizenship in the strictly political sense of the term. Whatever may or may not be said 
about EU-European citizenship, it is a child of capitalist democracy. And therein lies the 
specific problematic in the case of Sinti, Roma, and Travelers. The question that needs to 
be addressed is to what extent Sinti, Roma, and Travelers can and wish themselves (!) to 
be covered by a notion of group rights that aims to preserve a specific identity, an identity 
that  is  clearly  at  odds  with  the  social  and  economic  space  defined  by  capitalist 
democracy. This is not about fighting prejudice or preserving a cultural heritage, both of 
which are valid and necessary aims worth fighting for. It is about the consequences of 
policies  aimed  to  combat  poverty,  exclusion,  and  loss  of  life  chances.  Even  if  all 
possible/potential  precautions  for  the  preservation  and  acceptance  of  “difference”  in 
different  institutional  settings  such  as  schools  and  workplaces  were  taken,  the  lived 
experience of difference in the end would not be the same. A “hybrid” identity inevitably 
would develop even under the best of circumstances (and it already exists for many). I 
venture to say that this would not be bad, as Europe and all Europeans are by definition F. Peter Wagner, A Finger for Berlusconi  29 
“mutts”  (to  use  US  President  Barack  Obama’s  self-description),  even  if  nationalistic 
discourses would like to maintain otherwise. But this is clearly not for me to decide. 
There are, I am afraid, no easy answers to the issues raised in this essay. The 
European  Union  and  the  process  of  European  integration  thereby  only  share  in  the 
present conundrum of democracy and governance, wedged as they are between local 
loyalties and cosmopolitan aspirations. I simply hope that this essay has at least pointed 
out what is at stake in the choices to be made. 
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